Law Enforcement Response to Hate

A broad, ongoing training curriculum can ensure officers are knowledgeable and prepared to respond to hate crimes and carry out preventive strategies. It is important to research trainers in advance, to confirm they emphasize cultural competency and don’t perpetuate stereotypes and misinformation. Consider including recognized community organizations representing people from targeted communities in the trainings.

Making Sure Your Agency is Prepared

These important topics should be addressed in new recruit programs and ongoing trainings:

Hate Crimes: what constitutes a hate crime; officers’ reporting responsibilities; updates on the provisions of the state’s hate crime statute and federal statutes, i.e. what victim classes are covered.

Investigating Hate Crimes: techniques to investigate incidents and suspects thoroughly and document everything, so prosecutors are empowered to decide if a hate crime enhancer should be attached to a charge.

Reporting Procedures: proper reporting protocols; making procedures transparent and accessible to people and communities who may be targets of hate; reducing risks that patterns of hate and bias attacks might be missed.

Burden of Proof: different burdens of proof, standards, and pressures for police officers and prosecutors: frontline investigators need to look for and gather the right information and evidence and show empathy and respect for victims, while prosecutors need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt – and possibly bias motivation for a hate crime charge; promoting cooperation between agencies and prosecutors.

Protocols When Hate Groups Come to Town: advance planning to ensure safety of all residents and minimize the risk of violent clashes; clear public communications; transparency for agency operations.

Cultural Competency: increase understanding of different cultural groups in the community – as a general rule and especially as demographics shift and become more diverse; strategies for establishing relationships with diverse populations; personal bias within departments.

Language: rudimentary language skills to communicate with diverse local communities and calm fears during interactions; agency procedures for engaging interpreters from the community; required for new recruit classes, as well as ongoing training programs.

Supporting Victims: understanding the distinct trauma experienced by hate crime victims; liaising effectively with victims to show support and refer them to victim witness units and community groups for additional services, so they can begin to heal – and potentially participate in a trial.

Law enforcement agencies are increasingly tasked with ensuring the safety of the public when local and visiting groups hold protests or conduct public speaking engagements. High-visibility events planned by white supremacist, white nationalist, anti-Muslim, Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi, “alt-right,” anti-government “sovereign citizen,” and other groups can prompt strong community reactions and opposition rallies, often resulting in violent clashes between the groups and destruction of property.

The challenge of protecting freedom of speech rights and avoiding violent interactions and disorder requires special preparation and training.

Charlottesville

In 2017, city leaders in Charlottesville, Virginia responded to multiple public protests and demonstrations, including:

• May 13 – A daytime march and a nighttime demonstration, featuring lit torches, organized by white nationalist, “alt-right” leader Richard Spencer and a local resident in protest of the city’s effort to remove a Civil War statue. Counter-protesters attended both events.
• May 14 – A candelight vigil focused on embracing diversity and inclusion and condemning the racist ideology of the previous day’s leaders. Violence erupted when Richard Spencer and others from the white nationalist demonstration arrived.
• July 8 –A Ku Klux Klan demonstration, countered by a vigorous opposition protest.
• August 11-12 – A major rally of white nationalist and extreme right-wing groups, branded “United the Right,” which included a surprise gathering with lit torches the night before the planned march. By the end of the event, three people had been killed, including a young woman who died when a man drove into a crowd of counter-protesters.

In response to the tragic deaths and the chaotic, dangerous atmosphere at these demonstrations, the City of Charlottesville commissioned an independent report to evaluate the city’s advance planning and responses to the events, and provide recommendations to guide future planning. The report was one step towards rebuilding trust with a community frightened, angered, and frustrated by the violence. There is need for much more work to rebuild this trust, and it is critical that active and ongoing engagement with the community targeted for hate help direct this work.

A summary of some of the key points included in the independent report include:

• The May demonstrations caught Charlottesville Police Department (CPD) by surprise because permits were not required, and events were not announced to the public. Social media monitoring and increased research about these groups and their regional members improves intelligence gathering.
• Operational plans for the Klan demonstration and the Unite the Right rally would have been significantly more effective if law enforcement had sought out and integrated advice from jurisdictions that had experienced similar events, i.e. successful strategies for managing the Klan and counter-protests, and the need to implement strict separation between opposing groups. Local LE underestimated the potential for violence and were unprepared for violent clashes.
• Despite the complexity and unique nature of the events, officers did not receive sufficient information or training to be prepared. Department-wide training, all-hands meetings, and day-of briefings cannot be replaced by roll-call updates or email communications. Important training topics include: field training; civil disturbance; mass unrest; de-escalation techniques; First Amendment protected activities; operational goals and contingency plans; and more generally, what to expect at a Klan rally.
• Most CPD officers did not have riot gear – 80% lacked helmets in advance of the Klan rally – and many lacked familiarity with the gear and sufficient training.
• Participating agencies must work in coordination and operate within a unified command. Crucial points include: awareness of operations plans; integrated on-site communications; and joint trainings.
• Poor planning led to several unlawful-assembly declarations, which required aggressive actions by law enforcement to enforce, including forced dispersal with tear gas.
• Preoccupied with preparations for the Unite the Right rally, city leaders did not sufficiently respond to criticism or questions from the public, or explain tactical decisions after the chaotic Klan rally, leaving residents and business owners feeling extremely frustrated and distrustful.
• City council’s last-minute efforts to move the Unite the Right rally to a different location forced law enforcement agencies to develop two operational plans. In this regard, city officials should respect LE recommendations.
• CPD did not receive accurate information about the legality of restricting weapons other than firearms before the Unite the Right event. Though it would have been challenging to enforce a ban on bats, poles, shields, and other objects that can be easily weaponized, such a prohibition would have reduced dangerous encounters.
• Despite clear evidence of violence at the Unite the Right event, police consistently failed to intervene, de-escalate, or otherwise respond. Attendees claimed that the CPD police chief allowed violent clashes, so the rally could be shut down as illegal later. Participating agencies refused to engage in clashes, to avoid risking harm to officers. As a result, people felt physically vulnerable, despite the formidable law enforcement presence, and the community’s faith in law enforcement was eroded. All agency personnel should be prepared to respond immediately to violence of any kind without unduly jeopardizing officer safety.

The University of Florida Prepares for a White Nationalist Speaker

Two months after the tragic deaths in Charlottesville, Richard Spencer was scheduled to speak at a private, ticketed event on the University of Florida campus in Gainesville. In anticipation of the October 19th engagement, the University Police Department worked together with Gainesville Police Department, Alachua County Sheriff’s Department, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Florida Highway Patrol on security plans, and Florida Governor Rick Scott declared a state of emergency to allow for a quicker response from the National Guard if they were needed. University of Florida Police Department also reached out to law enforcement agencies in Berkeley and Charlottesville, to gather intelligence about Spencer’s recent appearances in their towns.

Security plans implemented for the event enabled Spencer to proceed with his talk (though many in the audience booed and taunted him) and maintained mostly peaceful demonstrations. Five people were treated for minor injuries resulting from scuffles, one person was arrested for resisting an officer’s orders, and another (hired as security by a media outlet) was arrested for carrying a firearm. After Spencer had left the campus, an altercation at a bus stop culminated with a Spencer supporter shooting into a small group of protesters. Nobody was hurt, but the shooter was later picked up with his two companions, and all three were charged with attempted homicide.

University of Florida Police Chief Linda Stump-Kurnick, Assistant Vice President of Public and Environmental Safety, shared the top practices that reduced opportunities for violence and disorder, as identified in their after-action report.

Successful practices included:

• ICS/NIMS: From the initial planning day, the University of Florida (UF) Police Chief and Assistant Vice President committed to compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) standards, including use of Incident Command System (ICS). This framework provided for a consistent and common approach to planning, terminology, resource requests, command, and other facets. A unified Incident Action Plan (IAP) was developed for the event and signed by all three Unified Commanders.
• Prohibited Items: The University developed a comprehensive list of prohibited items based upon feedback and experiences from the cities of Charlottesville and Berkeley. A draft list was reviewed and adjusted by Public Safety, General Counsel, and University Relations leadership before finalization. The items were banned in order to eliminate makeshift weapons and body armor in the protest areas, and to prevent protestors from covering their faces (i.e., masks and bandanas) – both significant issues in Charlottesville and Berkeley. Observations and anecdotal evidence indicate this action was successful in preventing agitators from attending, and in forcing protestors to dump banned items before entering protest areas. Large banners listing the items were displayed prior to checkpoints into the protest areas. The communicated list of prohibited items was also available on the UF Free Speech website, which provided extensive information about the October 19th event to prepare students, event attendees, professors, and other University staff for the day.
• Crowd Control: UF employed three layers of security around the venue to protect the crowd. A fourth layer was added by the City of Gainesville’s adjacent SW 34th Street Closure, which marked the first screening for prohibited items. An outer perimeter consisted of road closures and checkpoints that limited vehicle access and provided a second screening for prohibited items. The inner perimeter was constructed of vehicle barriers and barricaded protest areas, providing a third screening for prohibited items. Two protest areas were created with the barricades, designed to separate groups by ideology. An empty zone separated the two areas and was designed to be larger than a protester’s ability to hurl an object at the opposing group. The final layer of security surrounded the venue. Protestors were not allowed in the immediate vicinity of the venue but could see it. Only ticket holders could enter the venue, and everyone, including the speaker and his entourage, had to use walk-through magnetometers. This layer was the fourth screening for prohibited items. A significant, visible police presence enhanced these crowd-control measures.

• Soft Uniforms: With guidance from the Florida Highway Patrol, the Unified Commanders adopted a soft uniform approach. Protestors did not see a “militarized” look from law enforcement, which can lead to a hostile crowd. Additionally, most law enforcement heavy equipment was staged out of sight from the protestors. “Hard hat teams” or “hatch teams” were readily available and staged for quick response. However, their deployment was only to be initiated if enforcement action was needed.
• Check-In / Badging Process: With hundreds of responders on scene, maintaining accountability for safety was a significant concern and top priority. Each individual had to check-in the morning of the incident and was given a colored armband. Without an armband, even if in uniform, a person was not allowed on scene. The color of the armband was not made known until that morning in order to prevent forgery. This approach was a larger version of the badging process employed for Gator football games.
• GIS Support: Simultaneous to the planning for the event, the University was in the process of creating a department to provide GIS resources to administrative units. The Director of that unit was tasked to the effort and created a secure, public safety map interface. The mapping interface overlaid information from all responding agencies over UF data layers. The map was updatable in real time and allowed for coordinated planning in regards to placement of people and resources. UF will be working in the future to better integrate the mapping component into event planning.